The Philosophy of Psychiatry webinar series from the UQ脌M department of philosophy will feature Philip Gerrans from the University of Adelaide at 6pm on Thursday, September 21, 2023.
Register here to participate:
Abstract
The neuroscience of pain has moved a long way in the last few decades. The classic
modular accounts distinguish 鈥渟ensorimotor pain鈥� and emotional suffering and associate
them with different neural substrates. On these accounts some conditions such as 鈥渟ocial
pain鈥� (of ostracism or humiliation) empathy and chronic pain are the result of activity
in systems associated with distress, not primary sensory (nociceptive) processing.
Recent 鈥渕atrix鈥� accounts of pain offer a different explanation. Complicating these
questions is the degree of overlap between neural activity in conditions such as observation
of another鈥檚 injury and injury to the self. Leading some to claim that empathy and
pain experience depend on activity in the same systems. This is not quite right but
it is suggestive.
I offer an Active Inference account of pain and suffering that reconciles tensions
between different accounts. While active inference can be a highly technical theory
in biophysics or neurocomputation we can detach the basic principles from the formalism.
The core idea is that processing across the mind is anchored by a multidimensional
self-model that co-ordinates regulatory activity for the organism鈥檚 benefit. The dimensional
structure of pain and suffering reflects the dimensional structure of that model.
I show how the patterns of association and dissociation between pain, suffering and
self awareness can be explained by this model.